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The Union Convention 
An Examination of Limitations 
on Démocratie Décision Making 
John C. Anderson 
This article examine a séries of factors which may limit 
the existence of démocratie décision making within the union 
convention. 
Industrial relations theory and research hâve stressed the vital 
rôle played by the convention in the government of national unions. 
The union meeting in convention has been depicted as a constitutional 
assembly, a législative body, a final court of appeals, a nominating and 
électoral congress, and as a forum for the review and évaluation of past 
policy and performance.1 Moreover, the convention itself has been 
identified as one of the cornerstones of national union democracy. As 
Leiserson pointed out: «Though a représentative body, the typical con-
vention is identified with the union itself as if it were a gênerai meeting 
of ail members. »2 Given the importance of the functions performed by 
the convention, the degree to which démocratie decision-making occurs 
within the convention would appear to be vital to the existence of 
national union democracy. This article examines a séries of factors 
which may limit the existence of 
démocratie décision making within 
the union convention. 
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1
 For a description of the functions of the national convention see: William 
LEISERSON, American Trade Union Democracy (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1959), pp. 122-145. 
2
 Ihid., p. 122. 
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REVIEW OF PAST RESEARCH 
Very little empirical research has focused on the union convention 
when compared with other aspects local or national union democracy.3 
However, the work which has been done suggests some of the im-
portant dimensions to consider when analyzing démocratie decision-
making within and across conventions. The most frequently cited con-
cern has been the time between formai conventions. The more often 
conventions are held, the greater the opportunity for members to 
directly impact union policy, constitution, and leadership. Several 
studies hâve examined the frequency of conventions as well as the 
possible factors which may influence frequency. Bambrick and Haas 
analyzed 194 union constitutions and discovered that CIO unions were 
more likely than AFL unions to hold national conventions in periods of 
two years or less. Larger unions were also less likely to hold annual 
or biennial conventions.4 
Marcus extended the above research to include âge of the union, 
subgroup représentation on the executive board, and membership 
restrictions, in addition to size as possible déterminants of convention 
frequency.5 The results suggest that larger unions, older unions, and 
unions without subgroup représentation (géographie, occupational, sex) 
on executive boards were likely to meet less frequently. The number of 
restrictions on union membership was not related to convention fre-
quency. Edelstein and Ruppel replicated Marcus' study (and used it for 
comparison) with a sample of British unions and failed to find any 
relation between subgroup représentation or âge and convention fre-
quency.6 Furthermore, the British data revealed an opposite association 
between size and frequency; larger unions were more likely to hold 
biennial conventions. Although the research reviewed indicates some of 
the characteristics associated with fréquent conventions, little is re-
3
 See William FAUNCE, «Delegate Attitudes Toward the Convention in the 
UAW,» Industrial and Labor Relations Review, XV (July, 1962), footnote number 2, 
p. 463. No change in the state of the art has occurred since this time. 
4
 James BAMBRICK and G. HAAS. Handbook of Union Government, Struc-
ture and Procédures (New York: National Industrial Conférence Board, Studies in 
Personnel Policy, 1955), pp. 78-81. 
5
 Philip MARCUS, «Union Conventions and Executive Boards: A Formai 
Analysis of Organizational Structure,» American Sociological Review, XXXI (January, 
1966), pp. 61-70. 
6
 J. D. EDELSTEIN and H. J. RUPPEL, «Convention Frequency and Oli-
garchie Degeneration in British and American Unions,» Administrative Science Quarterly, 
XV (March, 1970), pp. 47-56. 
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vealed about the extent of democracy surrounding the actual con-
vention proceedings. Or as Marcus intimâtes the more basic question 
concerns the control over the internai dynamics of the convention.7 
Two other characteristics of the convention hâve been raised as 
concerns for national union democracy: convention size and duration. 
Several authors hâve commented on the trend toward small conventions 
(in terms of number of delegates).8 The larger the convention, the less 
the opportunity for individuals to participate in the process ; the harder 
it is for challengers to mount effective and organized opposition; and 
the greater the potential for control by the administration of convention 
proceedings. With large conventions, facilities must be booked years in 
advance and extensions in duration may be virtually impossible. Thus, 
the time allotted to convention proceedings must be adéquate to allow 
ail business to be transacted. However, in many conventions the limited 
amount of time available may be filled up with speeches, cérémonials, 
and social events. Ail of which tend to limit the ability of the conven-
tion to act as a démocratie assembly. 
Perceptions of delegates of the purpose of national conventions 
hâve also been examined as indicators of democracy.9 Faunce ad-
ministered questionnaires to ail delegates in attendance on the second 
day of the 1959 UAW convention. Response patterns which would 
support the existence of démocratie décision making were examined. 
Viewing the convention as important in determining union policy was 
considered a prerequisite to having a démocratie convention. Over 
ninety percent of the delegates considered the convention as very im-
portant in determining union policy. A second criterion used was the 
direction of communication. The fact that the flow of communications 
upward to the national union was rated as a more important purpose 
of the convention than «making sure that members back home are 
informed about UAW policies» was identified as another indicator of 
convention democracy. 
Authors hâve also delineated the sélection of convention delegates, 
the distribution of delegate entitlements to locals, and the character-
istics of delegates as important factors to be considered in assessing 
the probability of démocratie decision-making. Faunce asked the de-
legates what proportion of the local membership voted in the delegate 
7
 MARCUS, op. cit. 
8
 LEISERSON, op. cit., pp. 122-145. 
9
 FAUNCE, op. cit., p. 469. 
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élections to check on the extent of their representativeness.10 Others 
hâve discussed whether the delegates are elected from the local member-
ship in gênerai or from within the local executive.11 Moreover, authors 
hâve questioned whether limitations on delegate eligibility are too 
extrême to permit adéquate représentation of the local membership.12 
Thus, prior to the convention, the process by which delegates are 
selected should be adéquate to guarantee représentation of major in-
terest groups within the local. 
Local entitlements to delegates and votes hâve also been a topic of 
concern. Leiserson présents the problem as the ability to balance repré-
sentation between small and large locals while at the same time main-
taining a reasonable overall size of the convention.13 The balancing may 
be important given that locals of différent sizes may hâve différent 
interests and since small locals are less likely to send représentatives to 
conventions. In one article, Faunce reported that delegates from large 
locals were more likely to submit resolutions; hâve delegates in at-
tendance ; and view the convention as important in the détermination of 
policy.14 Furthermore, delegates from larger locals were more likely to 
speak on issues, oppose national officers, attend caucuses, and be more 
aware of pressures from national officers. Conversely, delegates re-
presenting smaller locals were less likely to hâve received instructions 
regarding resolutions and therefore, felt less bound by any instructions. 
The author concludes that large locals contribute more to national 
union democracy. However, it also emphasizes the importance of 
constitutional provisions relating to delegate entitlements and their 
implications for démocratie convention decision-making. 
Stieber points out that little is known about the delegates in terms 
of their union offices, occupations, years of membership, previous con-
vention expérience or other démographie characteristics.15 Rothbaum 
raises the same issue in relation to whether the average delegate may be 
considered a union professional or a lay member.16 One of Michels main 
10
 Jbid., pp. 465-468; LEISERSON, op. cit., p. 129. 
11
 Sam ROMER, The International Brotherhood of Teamsters : lis Government 
and Structure (New York: Wiley and Sons, 1962) pp. 13-15. 
12
 LEISERSON, op. cit., p. 129. 
n
 Ibid., p. 128. 
14
 William FAUNCE, «Size of Locals and Union Democracy,» American 
Journal of Sociology, LXVII (November, 1962), pp. 291-298. 
15
 Jack STIEBER, Governing the UAW (New York: Wiley and Sons, 1962), 
p. 17. 
16
 Melvin ROTHBAUM, The Government of the OU, Chemical, and Automic 
Workers Union (New York: Wiley and Sons, 1962), p. 157. 
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contentions is that over time union leaders and members become in-
creasingly différent in terms of their characteristics and attitudes.17 
Thus for a convention to be truly représentative (in Michels' sensé) 
delegates should approximate their membership in characteristics and 
attitudes. The amount of delegate turnover has been taken as one in-
dicator of delegate representativeness.18 
Decision-making within the convention is based on majority voting 
over resolutions. Resolutions may be presented by locals or the union 
executive prior to convention, or by delegates from the convention 
floor.19 Each of the case studies of union government has discussed the 
extent of discussion and opposition.20 Debate has been characterized as 
vigorous, although varying by issue21 or without organized opposition. 
«There are conventions in which the delegate body is not much more 
than an audience registering approval of programs presented by the 
officers while it is being [socially] entertained.»22 This quote appears to 
be applicable to the majority of conventions discussed in the literature.23 
Several reasons hâve been suggested for the lack of vigorous 
discussion over resolutions. First, recommendations for concurrence or 
non-concurrence are made by the various committees appointed by the 
national executive. Thèse committees are likely to represent the in-
terests of their appointers. Allen also points out that delegates are easily 
swayed by the emotional appeals of staff or executive or by their 
superior knowledge as specialists.24 Faunce discovered that instructions 
from locals or pressures exerted by the national executive may limit 
discussion.25 The use of rules to limit debate has also been a subject of 
concern.26 A great deal of controversy has arisen over the rights of 
17
 Robert MICHELS, Political Parties: A Sociological Study of the Oligarchical 
Tendencies of Modem Democracy (New York: The Free Press, 1962). 
18
 STIEBER, op. cit., p. 17; ROTHBAUM, op. cit., pp. 157-158. 
19
 Lloyd ULMAN, The Government of the Steel Workers' Union (New York: 
Wiley and Sons, 1962), p. 104; Mark PERLMAN, Democracy in the International 
Association of Machinists (New York: Wiley and Sons, 1962), p. 78; ROMER, op. cit., 
p. 20. 
20
 Case studies referred to are the Wiley séries: Michael HARRINGTON, The 
Retail Clerks (New York: Wiley and Sons, 1962) ; PERLMAN, op. cit. ; ROMER, op. cit. ; 
ROTHBAUM, op. cit. ; STEIBER, op. cit. ; and ULMAN, op. cit. 
21
 STIEBER, op. cit., p. 54. 
22
 LEISERSON, op. cit., p. 126. 
23
 See case studies on unions cited in note 19. 
24
 V. L. ALLEN, Power in Trade Unions (London: Longmans, Green, and 
Co., 1954), pp. 110-113. 
25
 FAUNCE, «Size of Local,» op. cit., pp. 291-298. 
26
 STIEBER, op. cit., pp. 19-25. 
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staff to attend and vote in conventions. While staff of the steel workers 
are granted full delegate status ;27 OCAWU staff hâve the right to voice 
but no vote ;28 while the machinists encourage staff to stay away from 
the convention altogether.29 Thus, not only the composition of delegates 
and union committees but also pressures exerted by local executive, 
national executive or staff may limit the amount of discussion and 
debate over convention resolutions. 
Most of the factors presented in relation to convention democracy 
— frequency, purpose, internai dynamics — hâve only been the em-
phasis of single studies or theoretical inquiry. The présent research, 
through description and analysis examines the impact of several of thèse 
factors on decision-making within the thirty-first biennial convention of 
the British Columbia Government Employée's Union in June 1975.30 
METHOD 
Sample : Questionnaires were mailed to ail registered delegates at 
the convention; along with a stamped return envelope. A total of 126 of 
the 214 local delegates returned usable questionnaires, a response rate 
of fifty-nine percent. An examination of the distribution of responses by 
local and occupational component31 revealed that non-respondents ap-
peared to be randomly distributed across local and occupational com-
ponents. 
Measures : Data on delegate élections, convention committee ap-
pointment and composition, delegate entitlements, rôle of the conven-
tion, and resolution submission procédures were obtained from the 
union's constitution and bylaws. 
27
 ULMAN, op. cit., pp. 106-110. 
28
 ROTHBAUM, op. cit., pp. 57-58. 
29
 FERLMAN,op. cit., p. 81. 
30
 It should be noted that the analysis reported hère may not be generalizable 
to ail unions. The convention may play a différent rôle in unions with national versus 
local labor markets, craft versus industrial versus white collar unions, and private versus 
public sector unions. In ail of thèse the rôle of the international, the type of delegates 
(business agents, elected leaders, or members), and the issues discussed may vary. There-
fore, criteria which make a convention appear apparently démocratie may not be as 
important. 
31
 The British Columbia Government Employées Union is subdivided into 
fourteen occupational components, which hâve locals in twelve géographie régions 
throughout the province. The component is the unit at which wage and spécifie benefit 
bargaining occurs. 
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The amount of discussion and opposition over the resolutions 
presented to convention delegates was assessed by direct observation of 
the convention proceedings. Each resolution was classified as having no 
opposition, some opposition, or a significant amount of opposition both 
through debate and voting. This was accomplished by counting the 
number of speakers for and against the resolution as well as the distribu-
tion of votes on each resolution. Observation also provided additional 
data on the impact of executive, staff and other delegates on the 
freedom of delegates to vote as they pleased. 
The questionnaire included items on perceived freedom in voting, 
importance of the convention in determining policy, membership 
satisfaction with convention décisions, instructions from local and com-
ponent officiais, the importance of various purposes of the convention, 
and perceived pressure on delegates to vote in a certain manner. In-
dividuals responded on six point scales anchored with appropriate polar 
adjectives. In addition, questions were included to obtain information 
about the characteristics of the individual and his local. 
RESULTS 
The Convention Delegates : Représentation of locals to the 
B.C.G.E.U. convention was based on membership. Each local is en-
titled to one delegate for the first 100 members and one additional 
delegate for each additional 200 members of major part thereof.32 The 
procès s by which delegates are elected from within the local is establish-
ed under local bylaws. An examination of bylaws of a séries of locals 
revealed that in the majority of cases delegates were elected from with-
in the local executive rather than the membership as a whole. This is 
verified by the fact that eighty-seven percent of the respondents 
currently held union positions. Therefore, although the structure of 
delegate entitlements allows for equal représentation of ail locals without 
restrictions on the maximum number of delegates, the process by which 
union members become delegates may jeopardize the extent to which 
the resulting delegates are représentative of the local members. 
A démographie sketch of the delegates reveals that they are about 
forty years old ; eighty-seven percent maie ; having been with the union 
and the provincial government about seven and a half years; sixty-
32
 The Constitution and Bylaws (Vancouver: British Columbia Government 
Employées' Union, 1974), Article 6, Section 3. 
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three percent hâve been members of other unions, and eighty-seven 
percent hold some elected union position. However, sixty percent were 
attending their first convention. Thus, the overall picture presented is of 
an experienced unionist. In order to check their similarity to the member-
ship of the union, the delegates characteristic were compared with a 
random sample of members from four Vancouver locals.33 The results 
indicate that the delegates are on an average older; more likely to be 
maie; hâve been in the union longer; more likely to hâve been a union 
member in the past; and more likely to be a union officiai. If individual 
characteristics can be taken as indicative of évidence for Michels34 
gap between the leadership and membership, thèse findings mise some 
doubt about the ability of the convention to truly represent the wishes 
and interests of the unions' membership.35 
The Purpose of the Convention : Faunce argued that for the con-
vention to fulfill its rôle in union government, it must be viewed as 
important in determining union policy.36 Over ninety-percent of the 
respondents ranked «to détermine B.C.G.E.U. policy» as either the 
first, second or third most important purpose of the convention (with 
fifty-nine percent ranking it as most important) (see Table 1). The 
directionality of the flow of information was also assessed as an in-
dicator of democracy. More than twice as many delegates ranked the 
représentation of local views in policy as being important compared to 
providing information to members back home (77 versus 33%, respect-
ively). Finally, since the convention is the only body which can elect 
national officers,37 the élection of union officers should also be per-
ceived as an important function of the convention. The third largest 
proportion of the sample (41%) ranked this factor as important. The 
pattern of results suggest that the preconditions established by Faunce 
for a démocratie convention are met with the présent sample of de-
legates. 
33
 The four locals represented a variety of occupational components in the 
Vancouver area. However, response rates were below forty-five percent for each local 
so that the representativeness of the respondents in comparison to total membership is 
not known. 
34
 MICHELS, op. cit. 
35
 The fact that leaders may be able to predict worker préférences and interests 
without having similar characteristics is shown by U. GLUSKINOS and B. KESTEL-
MAN, « Management and Labor Leaders' Perception of Worker needs as Compared 
with Self-Reported Needs,» Personnel Psychology, XXIV (Summer, 1971), pp. 239-246. 
36
 FAUNCE, «Delegate Attitudes,» op. cit., p. 468. 
37
 FAUNCE, «Delegate Attitudes,» op. cit., p. 468. 
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TABLE 1 
Perceived Purpose of the Convention 
Ranked Importance 
First Second Third Total 
State Purpose % % % % 
To inform members back home 6.3 7.9 19.0 33.3 
To increase union solidarity 6.3 8.7 21.4 36.5 
To show members approval of union 
policy 1.6 3.2 2.4 7.1 
To détermine B.C.G.E.U. policy 58.7 21.4 10.3 90.5 
To hâve local views represented in 
policy 20.6 43.7 12.7 77.0 
To elect union officers 0.8 10.3 30.2 41.3 
Total N = 126 94.3 95.2 96.0 
The Convention Decision-Making Process : Décisions within the 
convention are made on the basis of majority votes of ail delegates in 
convention.38 For a resolution to be considered by the convention it 
must be received by Union headquarters at least sixty days prior to the 
convention date.39 Only resolutions which hâve been submitted to and 
approved by a component or area council may be brought before the 
convention.40 Thus, no individual member may submit a resolution to 
be dealt with directly by the convention. Furthermore, resolutions may 
not be presented by individual delegates from the convention floor. 
Once ail resolutions, submitted within the prescribed time limits hâve 
been compiled, it is the responsibility of the union executive to add 
their own resolutions41 and then to arrange for copies to be forwarded 
to components, locals, area councils and members prior to the con-
vention.42 
Each resolution is presented to the convention by the resolution 
committee in the form of a recommendation for concurrence or non-
concurrence. A straight majority vote through a show of hands is suf-
ficient to pass or defeat any resolution.43 In addition, resolutions may 
37
 Constitution and Bylaws, op. cit., Article 8. 
38
 Ibid., Article 7, Section 5. 
39
 Ibid., Article 7, Section 4(c). 
40
 Ibid., Article 7, Section 4(a). 
41
 Ibid., Article 7, Section 4(b). 
42
 Ibid., Article 7, Section 4 (d and c). 
43
 Ibid., Article 7, Section 5. 
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be referred back to committee for reconsideration and subséquent re-
submission to convention. 
Democracy in Convention Decision-Making : The previous section 
outlined the constitutional procédure by which resolutions are submitted 
and décisions are made. However, démocratie procédure may be neces-
sary but not sufficient for démocratie decision-making. One possible 
criteria to assess is the amount of opposition and debate over the resolu-
tions presented to the delegates for décision. At the B.C.G.E.U. con-
vention only thirty-six percent of the respondents actually spoke for or 
against the resolutions presented. However, sixty percent were able to 
state that definite factions existed over particular issues at the con-
vention. 
Table 2 présents an analysis of the discussion over the resolutions 
by issue and recommendation of the resolutions committee. First, it is 
important to note that not one recommendation of the resolutions com-
mittee was defeated. Therefore, in no instance was there enough op-
position to significantly affect the voting results on any given resolu-
tion.44 Only in 4.8 percent of the cases was there a significant debate 
with both pro and con statements regarding the issue. Moreover, in ap-
proximately 57 percent of the resolutions there was no discussion about 
the issue and no opposition in the voting. It appears that on the basis 
of the opposition and debate criterion, little democracy existed within 
the convention. However, with this analysis it is impossible to tell 
whether thèse results are due to démocratie submission, review and pré-
sentation of resolutions or limitations on the decision-making process. 
The amount of discussion seems to vary by issue and by com-
mittee recommendation. On those issues where there was some discus-
sion and opposition (38.1%), more than half of them involved recom-
mendations by the resolutions committee for non-concurrence on a com-
ponent submitted resolution. Conversely, where concurrence was 
recommended and opposition ensued (n = 13), 46 percent were resolu-
tions submitted by the executive, 15.4 were substitute resolutions, and 
7.8 percent (or one resolution) involved a dues increase. A further 
44
 George BROOKS suggested another possible explanation for the lack of op-
position in convention decision-making. Consensus may be attained through the work of 
the executive and staff during the months prior to the convention. Major sources of 
opposition can be identified and persuaded to change their opinions, coopted by being 
appointed to staff or the resolutions committee, or bought off through various exchanges 
between the local and national union. More importantly fréquent contact and discus-
sion about the issues may be used to feel the puise of the membership so that resolutions 
which may create major factions within the union will not be presented to convention. 
Resolution 
Committee 
Recom-
mendation 
Concurrence 
Non-concur-
rence 
No décision 
referral to 
committee 
TABLE 2 
Opposition Over Resolutions by Issue and Resolution Committee Recommendation 
Collective 
Bargaining 
Vacation 
Leave 
Constitu-
tional 
Health & 
General 
Welfare Finances 
s d 
3 3 
Organiza-
tional 
n s a 
2 
Super-
annuation 
n s d 
4 
Life 
Member-
ship 
n s c 
4 
Miscellaneous 
n s d 
2 1 
Note: Issue catégories are those used by the B.C.G.E.U. to group resolutions at convention. 
Note: Although there were 75 resolutions to start, some were combined and resubmitted in the form of substitute resolutions and thus 
only 63 resolutions are reported in this table. 
Note: N = none; s = some; d = debate. 
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analysis by issue area revealed that constitutional amendments account-
ed for 44.4% of the resolutions over which their was discussion with 
the remainder being equally distributed across issues. Moreover, the 
three resolutions over which significant debate occurred were constitu-
tional amendments to increase the power of the executive over ac-
tivities of subordinate union bodies and members. This finding is con-
sistent with Rothbaum's contention that the greatest conflict in con-
ventions occurs over distribution of powers between the national and 
local levels of union government.45 
Limitations on Démocratie Decision-Making : Given the relative 
lack of discussion over the seventy-five resolutions presented to the 
convention, it is important to détermine the extent to which limitations 
existed on the delegates perceived freedom to vote in the manner de-
sired as well as the impact of those limitations on démocratie decision-
making. Table 3 présents the means and standard déviation of the pos-
sible limitations assessed and corrélations with three convention out-
come variables; the delegate's perceived freedom in voting, the im-
portance of the convention in décision making; the perceived satisfac-
tion of the membership with décisions made at convention. It is pro-
posed that the fewer the limitations of démocratie décision making, the 
greater the perceived freedom in voting; the greater the perceived im-
portance of the convention in policy making and the more satisfied the 
membership with convention décisions. 
In order to vote intelligently delegates require enough informa-
tion about the resolutions presented to convention. Fourteen days prior 
to the convention ail delegates receive the list of resolutions and the 
officers reports.46 Furthermore, most delegates hâve an opportunity to 
discuss the resolutions with their local membership or component or 
local executive. Thèse discussions may take the form of instructions 
on how to vote on the various resolutions. However, if the delegates 
did not hâve an adéquate opportunity to obtain information on the 
resolutions prior to convention little opportunity for obtaining the re-
quired information may hâve been available at the convention. Only 
eighteen of the resolutions were presented with any justification or 
reasoning for the committees recommendation. Moreover, where 
reasoning was given ail resolutions involved a movement for non-
concurrence. Thus, any individual who had not participated in com-
ponent or local discussions may not hâve had the needed data on which 
45
 ROTHBAUM, op. cit., p. 52. 
46
 Constitution and Bylaws, op. cit., Article 7. Section 5(c). 
TABLE 3 
Limitations on Démocratie Decision-Making in Union Conventions 
Corrélations with 
Limitations 
Having enough information 
Frior instructions trom local 
Frior instructions trom component 
Fressure to vote with component 
Fressure to vote with resolutions committee 
Fressure to vote with majonty 
F reedom to vote as desired 
Note: *p < .05. **p < .01. significance levels vary due to 
Note: Y = Yes. 
t reedom Importance oj 
X cr to V ote Con\ ention 
4.40 1.34 .14* 29** 
56% (Y) - 14 - . 0 7 
58% (Y) _ 71** - .11 
3.23 1.80 - . 1 9 * - . 0 1 
3.09 1.82 - .20** .08 
2.24 1.55 - .26** .09 
5.40 1.27 — .28** 
missing data. 
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to base décisions. Furthermore, since sixty percent of the delegates 
were attending their fîrst convention, it is unlikely that they would hâve 
been aware of the procédures of the convention or the available sources 
of information. 
Respondents were asked how often they felt that they had enough 
information to vote on the resolutions. The mean on a six point scale 
ranging from never to always, 4.40 indicated that on average delegates 
felt that most of the time they had enough information to vote on the 
resolutions. In addition, approximately the same proportion of delegates 
had received instructions from their local (56%) and component (58%). 
The results also reveal that those delegates who had received instruc-
tions from their components felt more informed than did those who had 
not received instructions (4.41 versus 3.98). 
The correlational analysis shows that the more often delegates feel 
that they hâve enough information to vote, the more often they feel 
free to vote as they please ; the more important they view the convention 
in determining union policy; and the more the members are perceived 
to be satisfied with décisions made at convention. Thus, the lack of in-
formation on resolutions may act as an important limitation on conven-
tion décision making. 
Delegates who had received prior instructions on how to vote from 
their component, perceived less freedom in voting and lower member 
satisfaction with convention décisions. Therefore, although component 
instructions may act to increase solidarity among delegates, it is also a 
potential limitation on the ability of delegates to adequately represent 
their constituents. Receiving local instructions also reduced perceived 
membership satisfaction with decision-making. No relationship was 
discovered with importance of the convention in policy making and 
either local or component instructions. 
The next set of potential limitations on démocratie décision making 
are the pressures on the delegate to vote in a certain way. As ail voting 
at the convention was by show of hands, many informai pressures may 
be brought to bear on the dissenting delegate. Moreover, when the 
delegate in unsure of the way to vote on a particular resolution, it is 
easiest to vote with the majority. Respondents reported that very little 
of this type of pressure (to vote with majority) existed at the convention 
(X = 2.24 on a six point scale). 
Given that recommendations of the resolutions committee were 
never rejected, and that little discussion occurred on the majority of 
resolutions, the pressure to support the resolutions committee may hâve 
been fairly strong. The respondents perceived that a moderate amount 
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of pressure to support resolution committee recommendations was used. 
Forty-fîve percent of the delegates responded either four, Ave, or six on 
a six point scale ranging from ne ver to always, with a mean of 3.09. 
Thus, pressure to maintain the status quo may be relatively strong 
through this mechanism.47 
Delegates representing locals from within a single occupational 
component were ail seated together at the convention. Several delegates 
noted that overt tactics were used to stop individuals from speaking or 
voting the «wrong» way. The prevalence of pressure to vote.with other 
component delegates was more often perceived than the corresponding 
pressure to vote with the majority or the resolutions committee at the 
convention. Fifty percent of the delegates reported that they felt pres-
sure quite often (four or above on a six point scale; mean 3.23) to 
vote in the same way as other component delegates. Overall, the 
findings suggest that delegates perceived some form of pressure to vote 
in certain direction moderately often. The existence of such pressure is 
a definite limitation on the ability of the convention to resuit in demo-
cratically made décisions. 
Examining the corrélations with perceived freedom in voting, it is 
discovered that the more often a delegate felt each type of pressure, the 
less likely he was to believe that he had voted in the way he wanted to. 
The three pressure measures were also negatively (and significantly) 
associated with the contention that members were satisfied with the 
décisions made at convention. No relation was found to the importance 
of the convention in policy making. Perceiving pressure had the strongest 
corrélations with limiting freedom in voting. 
Overall, how often did delegates feel that they could vote the way 
that they wanted to on resolutions? It appears that at this convention 
individuals almost always felt free in voting (X = 5.40 on a six point 
scale). However, the corrélations show that those delegates who did not 
perceive that freedom also viewed the convention as less important in 
setting union policy and did not believe that the membership were 
satisfied with the convention décisions. In fact, thèse associations 
were among the strongest limitations on convention democracy. Thus, 
freedom in voting (and not having enough information) acted as signifi-
cant factors in the potential for décisions to be made democratically 
within a union convention. 
47
 The resolutions committee is appointée! by the union executive from within 
the executive and staff of the union. Thus décisions of this group are likely to reflect the 
interests of the administration. 
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One final variable which was observed but not measured was the 
impact of union staff on convention decision-making. The most overt 
exhibit of pressure to support the resolutions committee was during a 
debate over increased centralized control over collective bargaining. 
Just at the point where the vote was to be taken the General Secretary48 
entered the convention hall to a standing ovation. He addressed the 
convention for approximately fifteen minutes with respect to the resolu-
tion at hand. Arguments were presented relating to the need for a united 
front in bargaining, the périls of fragmentation, and the required unity in 
the case of a change in government administration. The subséquent 
vote, although highly contested previously was almost unanimous as a 
resuit of his speech. 
One delegate reported that the General Secretary had been watch-
ing the debate on closed circuit video tape and that his entrance had 
been carefully timed. Although the General Secretary later denied this in 
an interview and stated that he had waited until ail the debates were 
completed before entering so as not to directly influence the proceed-
ings, he was definitely aware of his impact on the members and staff 
of the union. Staff involvement, then may be an important factor in the 
démocratie nature of convention décision making. 
DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS 
Researchers interested in national union democracy should re-
member that the convention is only one aspect of national democracy 
(others include powers of the executive over subordinate bodies and 
members and national élection) and that having fréquent conventions49 
(or studying the frequency of conventions) in itself is not a guarantee 
of démocratie union government. Many activities prior to and surround-
ing the convention are important to the existence of democracy. The 
sélection of delegates, the appointment or sélection of the resolutions 
and other convention committees, the resolution submission process, as 
well as the delegates access to convention committees and those com-
mittees power over what is presented to convention are ail areas for 
48
 In Febraury 1975, the General Secretary had been involved in a near fatal car 
accident while on union business. His entry at the convention was his first public ap-
pearance since that accident and was against doctors orders. He entered on crutches with 
visible difficulty ail of which contributed to the delegates1 response. 
49
 The B.C.G.E.U. constitution spécifies a definite time limit including a 
minimum and maximum range; Constitution and Bylaws, op. cit., Article 6, Section 2. 
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concern. Within the convention itself, the amount of discussion and 
limitations on that discussion deserve attention in assessing the extent 
of démocratie deeision-making or in building a theory of the true rôle of 
the convention in national union government. The présent study exam-
ined a séries of thèse factors and suggests some implications for theory 
and policy relevant to national union conventions. 
Several factors which may detract from démocratie deeision-
making are suggested by the présent analysis. First of ail, following 
Michels' concern,50 it is possible that delegates may not be truly re-
présentative of their constituent bodies. The inability to represent may 
be due to the structure of local entitlements as determined by the union 
executive ; the procédures and local involvement in élections to choose 
delegates; and the différences in characteristics and attitudes of the 
delegates in comparison to those of the local membership. Thèse factors 
are important in that ail tend to ensure support for administration 
proposais and fail to ensure that ail potential interest groups are re-
presented at convention. Thèse considérations in themselves may limit 
the amount of discussion about convention resolutions. 
Furthermore, it has been pointed out that if the convention is not 
viewed as important in the establishment of union policy it may not be 
able to perform its functions. This may be a necessary but not sufficient 
condition to guarantee démocratie deeision-making. The findings re-
ported hère suggest that although the convention was perceived as 
very important in policy making, little discussion occurred and other 
variables existed which tended to limit the importance of the conven-
tion and membership satisfaction with convention décisions. 
In an absolute sensé, very little debate ensued over resolutions 
presented to delegates for décisions at the convention. Several impor-
tant insights into the factors which may limit the vitality of the con-
vention are identified. Restrictions on who, when, and where resolu-
tions may be submitted as well as the rôle of the union executive in 
screening and compiling the resolutions may affect the resulting discus-
sion. The composition, power, recommendations, and access to the 
resolutions committee may also detract from the démocratie nature of 
the convention. Thus, even prior to the convention itself many forces 
may hâve been operating which will place outer limits on the potential 
for décisions made to be représentative of the interests of the member-
ship. 
50
 MICHELS, op. cit. 
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Within the convention itself, several influences may limit the 
amount of debate, making the convention less important in policy 
making in the eyes of both the membership and the delegates. Not 
having enough information on the resolutions, receiving prior instruc-
tions on how to vote, feeling pressure from various sectors, and not 
feeling free to vote indepently on resolutions were ail found to be im-
portant deterents to démocratie decision-making within the convention. 
Union staff were also seen to hâve a strong impact of how resolutions 
were decided. 
Ail of the results hâve important implications for both policy-
makers, académies and practitioners alike who hâve an interest in 
démocratie union government. The fact that législation may establish 
outside time limits on the period between conventions does little to 
guarantee that décisions made or élections held at convention will meet 
the desired standards of representativeness. Moreover, given the im-
portance of the convention to national union government more research 
is needed into the déterminants of convention democracy. This study 
has only tentatively specified some of the variables which might hâve 
an impact on décision making. More extensive analysis is required into 
the rôle of the resolutions committee, union staff, and delegate in-
terest groups in union conventions. 
Les obstacles à la démocratie dans les congrès syndicaux 
Dans cette étude, l'auteur se demande dans quelle mesure les décisions prises dans 
les congrès syndicaux peuvent être démocratiques. 11 s'agit d'un cas type: le 3le congrès 
du Syndicat des employés du gouvernement de la Colombie Britannique tenu au mois 
de juin 1975. 
Dans la première partie de son exposé, l'auteur passe en revue les recherches 
scientifiques qui ont été effectuées sur le sujet. Selon ces recherches, plus les congrès 
se tiennent à intervalles rapprochés, plus la probabilité est grande que les décisions 
atteintes le soit de façon démocratique. On fait aussi entrer en ligne de compte la durée 
et le nombre de délégués au congrès. Ainsi, plus le nombre de délégués est élevé, moins 
ceux-ci ont de possibilités de s'exprimer, plus il leur est difficile de mettre en branle une 
opposition efficace et organisée, plus facile aussi est le contrôle des mécanismes de 
procédures du congrès. Les différents auteurs qui se sont intéressés à cette question ont 
indiqué que ce qui caractérise davantage la valeur démocratique d'un syndicat au cours 
d'un congrès, c'est la possibilité d'en établir les politiques et la facilité avec laquelle les 
délégués peuvent faire connaître l'opinion d^s membres qu'ils représentent. 
En ce qui concerne les délégués, on sait généralement assez peu de choses au 
sujet de leurs antécédents; fonctions syndicales, expérience de congrès antérieurs, carac-
téristiques démographiques, etc. En règle générale, les délégués appartenant à des 
sections locales importantes jouent un rôle plus grand dans le déroulement d'un congrès 
que les délégués provenant de sections locales moins fortes. 
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Un autre aspect qui peut indiquer le caractère démocratique d'un congrès, c'est 
la façon dont on dispose des résolutions qui peuvent être soumises par les sections locales 
ou la haute direction du syndicat, résolutions qui souvent sont peu discutées et qui ont 
été préalablement passées au crible par un comité spécial. 
Ce rappel fait, l'auteur décrit comment il a procédé à son enquête. Des question-
naires ont été adressés à tous les délégués inscrits au congrès et 126 d'entre eux sur 
un total de 216 ont retourné le questionnaire dûment rempli. Les faits relatifs au choix 
des délégués, à la formation des comités, au but du congrès, au mode d'examen des 
résolutions ont été tirés des statuts et règlements du syndicat. Pour apprécier la vigueur 
des débats et l'importance de l'opposition relativement aux résolutions, l'auteur s'en est 
remis au procès-verbal du congrès en classant les résolutions suivant qu'elles n'ont don-
né lieu à aucune, à peu ou à une grande opposition. 
Quant au questionnaire, il demandait si les délégués s'étaient sentis libres de voter 
selon leur choix, s'ils ressentaient l'importance du congrès dans l'élaboration de la poli-
tique du syndicat, si les membres des sections locales étaient satisfaits des décisions 
prises au congrès. Le questionnaire demandait aussi certains renseignements touchant le 
délégué et la section locale à laquelle il appartenait. 
L'auteur fait ensuite part des résultats de son enquête. Inutile d'insister sur la 
désignation des délégués, si ce n'est que, dans plusieurs sections locales, ceux-ci sont 
choisis uniquement parmi les membres du bureau de direction. Quant aux caractéristiques 
démographiques des délégués, qu'il suffise de rappeler qu'ils sont âgés de quarante ans en 
moyenne, que 87% d'entre eux sont des hommes, qu'ils sont membres du syndicat depuis 
sept ans et demi, que 63% d'entre eux ont déjà fait partie d'un autre syndicat, que 
87% occupent un poste dans leur section locale, que 60% en étaient à leur premier congrès. 
Les résultats indiquent que les délégués, en très grande majorité des hommes, sont plus 
âgés que la masse des syndiqués, font partie de l'association depuis plus longtemps 
qu'eux et qu'ils sont la plupart du temps des dirigeants d'une section locale. 
Pour les délégués, l'objectif majeur d'un congrès doit résider dans l'élaboration 
des politiques du Syndicat. Les délégués estiment aussi le congrès comme la Tribune où 
les délégués peuvent exprimer l'opinion de leurs mandants. On perçoit aussi l'élection 
du bureau de direction comme une des tâches importantes des délégués. 
L'auteur explique ensuite la procédure qu'on suit dans la présentation des résolu-
tions au congrès. Il note que seulement 36% des délégués sont intervenus dans les débats 
portant sur les résolutions et qu'aucune des recommandations présentées par le comité 
des résolutions n'a été battue. Il n'y eut véritable débat que dans environ 5% des cas. 
De plus, 57% des résolutions ont été adoptées sans débat ni opposition. La discussion 
varie selon la nature des questions débattues. Sur les sujets où il y eu certains débats et 
quelque opposition, il y en avait plus de la moitié dont le rejet était recommandé par le 
comité des résolutions. Par contre, là où l'adoption était recommandée et qu'il y eut 
opposition, presque la moitié de ces résolutions avaient été soumises par le bureau de 
direction, 15% étaient des résolutions modifiées et 7.8% (une seule résolution) portait 
sur l'augmentation des cotisations. D'autre part, une analyse plus approfondie indiquait 
que près de la moitié des résolutions débattues avaient trait à des modifications aux 
statuts et trois d'entre elles visaient à accroître les pouvoirs de l'organisation centrale. 
Au sujet des résolutions, il était demandé aux délégués s'ils étaient assez bien 
informés pour voter de façon intelligente. Sur ce point, les réponses données furent 
positives et les déléguées, qui avaient reçus des directives de leurs mandats, étaient 
les mieux informés. Plus les délégués se disent bien informés, plus ils se sentent libres de 
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voter comme ils leur plaît et plus ils considèrent le rôle du congrès dans l'élaboration de 
la politique du Syndicat. Cependant, les délégués qui avaient reçus des directives de 
leurs mandats se sentaient moins libres de voter à leur gré et ils paraissaient moins satis-
faits d'avoir apporté au congrès une participation véritable. 
Une limitation sérieuse au principe de décisions prises démocratiquement réside 
dans les pressions qui peuvent s'exercer sur les délégués au moment du vote parce que 
ceux-ci se prennent à main levée. Ainsi, le délégué hésitant est enclin à se ranger du 
côté de la majorité. Les répondants se disent peu influencés par ce genre de pressions. 
On reconnaissait, toutefois, que les recommandations du comité des résolutions pouvaient 
influencer leur vote, constatation qui est confirmé par le fait qu'aucune des recomman-
dations du comité ne fut rejeté. 
Par ailleurs, les délégués, qui étaient les mandataires d'un groupe professionnel 
donné, étaient placés ensemble au congrès. Plusieurs délégués ont noté à ce sujet que des 
tactiques manifestes avaient été utilisées pour empêcher des individus de parler ou de 
voter de «la mauvaise manière». La moitié des délégués ont reconnu avoir subi ce genre 
de pressions, ce qui est une entrave à la prise de décisions démocratiques. 
On a aussi retenu un dernier point: l'influence des permanents du syndicat pen-
dant le congrès. L'auteur cite l'exemple de l'intervention du secrétaire général du Syndi-
cat pour appuyer une recommandation du bureau de direction visant à la centralisation 
des négociations collectives. 
En conclusion, l'auteur remarque que le congrès n'est qu'un des aspects de l'ac-
tion démocratique à l'intérieur des syndicats et que la tenue de congrès fréquents n'est 
pas la garantie d'une action vraiment démocratique. Plusieurs activités antérieures à la 
tenue même des congrès, comme le choix des délégués, le choix des membres du comité 
des résolutions, l'accès des délégués aux divers comités du congrès et les pouvoirs de ces 
comités sont autant de domaines qui peuvent influencer sur les caractéristiques de la 
démocratie syndicale. Au cours du congrès lui-même, l'importance des débats doit retenir 
l'attention. Il ressort de ce qui précède que plusieurs facteurs peuvent nuire à la prise de 
décisions vraiment démocratiques. Il est possible que les délégués ne représentent pas 
vraiment les sections locales. On peut retenir encore que, si l'on ne considère pas le 
congrès comme un moyen d'établir les politiques du syndicat, celui-ci n'est pas en mesure 
de remplir ses fonctions, qu'il n'y a que peu de débats approfondis touchant les résolu-
tions, que l'influence du comité des résolutions est de nature à fausser le caractère dé-
mocratique du congrès que, même avant la tenue du congrès, des forces peuvent s'exer-
cer qui limitent la liberté d'action des délégués, que, pendant le congrès, nombre d'in-
fluences sont de nature à entraver également leur liberté et que, enfin, les permanents 
syndicaux peuvent de leur côté jouer un rôle décisif sur les décisions qui sont prises. 
